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And Jacob went near unto Isaac his father;
And he felt him, and said, The voice is Jacob's voice,
But the hands are the hands of Esau.
And he discernedhim not, because his hands were hairy,

As his brother Esau's hands: so he blessed him.

-Genesis

27:22-23.

INTRODUCTION

Although the architects of the Bretton Woods multilateral economic
institutions-the International Monetary Fund (Fund) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development-envisaged a trade
institution, the latter did not, for various reasons, eventually materialize.
The advent of the quasi-trade institution, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to a great extent remedied that lacuna by
regulating the trade aspects of the multilateral economic system. This
was mainly so, as was argued with respect to the existing multilateral
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institutions, because of the pervasive beggar-thy-neighbor policies characterizing the pre-World War II economic policies. Ensuring that gains
already made in managing the multilateral fiscal policy by the Fund were
not circumvented was a central preoccupation connected to the emergence of the GATT. This was the mosaic of the GATT's evolution and it
not surprisingly, not only influenced, but also found expression in its
specific provisions.
Against that background, no other area of the multilateral trade system can better account for the intertwined relationship between the
GATT's progeny, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the Fund
than the balance-of-payment situation of Members of the WTO. From
the beginning, it is instructive to note that the very nature of a balanceof-payment difficulty reveals a duality that resonates both in the foreign
exchange and in the trade situation of a country. Given that state of affairs, the difficulty encountered in any allocation of jurisdictional
competence over balance-of-payment becomes apparent.
This Note attempts to chart the division of labor in respect of balance-of-payment between the Fund and the WTO. More importantly, it
reflects on how the intertwined relationship between the Fund and the
WTO over balance-of-payment might impact on developing countries in
the unfolding architecture of trade.
Part I of this Note starts by revisiting the nature of a balance-ofpayment difficulty and goes on to trace the Fund's own approach in demarcating the boundaries of its competence in respect of that problem.
Part II examines the potential ramifications of the Fund's role in the
WTO, particularly in reference to developing country Members of the
WTO. To animate that subject, Part II engages in a case analysis involving India; namely India-QuantitativeRestrictions.' Part III proceeds to
situate the lessons drawn from that case analysis in the wider framework
of global economic governance issues, the objective being mainly to delineate the regulatory boundaries as they affect developing country
Members of the WTO. A fundamental point to note here is that the state
of a Member's balance-of-payment is intended to suggest the "need for
action" in its economic policies.2 Consequently, this Note identifies those
governance deficits likely to further constrain the available economic
policy tools open to developing countries in the international trade
sphere, particularly where the Fund's role in the WTO is not subjected to
Panel Report, India--Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile
1.
and Industrial Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS90/R (Apr. 6, 1999) [hereinafter IndiaQuantitative Restrictions]. See also the corresponding Appellate Body Report, WT/DS90/AB
(Aug. 23, 1999) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report].

2.

POUL HOST-MADSEN, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS: ITS MEANING AND USES

national Monetary Fund Pamphlet Series, 1967).

16 (Inter-
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scrutiny. In that connection, this Note points to alternative approaches
that will foster confidence among developing country Members. Part IV
concludes by re-iterating some key points made in the course of this
Note.
I. BALANCE-OF-PAYMENT AND THE FUND'S
JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE

A. Nature of a Balance-of-PaymentDifficulty

A country's balance of international transactions is a statement that
takes into account the values of all goods and services, all gifts and foreign aid, all capital loans, all official settlements and international
reserves coming in and going out of a country.3 The "balance-ofpayment account of a country is comprised of two accounts, namely, the
current account and the capital account."4 The capital account depicts a
record of a country's transactions in relation to its exports of goods and
services. Thus, for example, a government of Nigeria payment for the
importation of electrical equipment is recorded on the current account
side of the balance-of-payment account. On the other hand, the capital
account aspect of the balance-of-payment records a country's international investments or purchases abroad and vice versa.5 That is to say, the
capital account also reflects international investments and purchases in a
country. For example, income from an investment, say in an oil and gas

3.
PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 614 (1980). A short but concise discussion of the
concept of balance-of-payment is that by HOST-MADSEN, supra note 2; MAX J. WASSERMAN &
RAY M. WARE, THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 159 (1965) ("The balance of payments may be
defined as a statistical presentation of economic transactions during a given period between
the residents of one country, and those of the rest of the world, another country, group of
countries or specified international organizations). Note that sometimes the term "balance of
international transactions" is preferred to "balance-of-payments." This is so because the balance of international transactions reflects a country's accounts balance vis-a-vis its external
trading partners. For purposes of convenience, however, the terms "balance-of-payment" and
"balance of international transactions" are used interchangeably throughout this note. On the
uses of the balance-of-payment accounts, Wassermann and Ware state:
[T]he most important use of the balance of payments is to shed further light on the
operations of the economy by showing the nature and the magnitude of its overseas
transactions[.] More specifically, the balance of payments shows what was received
from abroad in goods, services, unilateral transfers and capital and what was given
in payment.
Id. at 161.

4.

PAUL R.

AND PRACTICE

5.

KRUGMAN

&

MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY

303 (1991).

BLANCHARD OLIVIER ET AL., MACROECONOMICS

111

(2000).
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company, is reflected on the capital side of the balance-of-payment account.6
Wasserman and Ware regard the "magnitude, character and movement of balance of payments surpluses and deficits as one of the
important features of this compilation [balance-of-payment accounts] .
In that connection, they observe that:
The existence of a deficit indicates that a nation may have been
living beyond its means internationally; that it has paid more to
foreign residents than it received. A non-reserve center cannot
run a deficit indefinitely. Sooner or later its holdings, its capacity
to procure additional reserves by borrowing, drawing on the IMF
or by obtaining grants from other governments is likely to disappear. Deficits in the case of such countries are a distinct
danger signal.8
Another implicit deduction from the statement above is that a deficit
indicates a situation where imports outstrip exports.9 Conversely, a surplus in a country's balance-of-payments indicates that it is living within
its means and accordingly, its exports exceed imports.
A number of factors could be responsible for a situation giving rise
to what is regarded as a balance-of-payment crisis. In general, a quality
of all those factors is that they have a negative impact on the foreign exchange and capital of the country. In particular, those responsible factors
may arise owing to internal, external, or even from an interaction of both
internal and external factors.'" The internal factors may include, inter
alia: a sudden and unforeseen failure in crop harvests particularly where
such harvests comprise the country's main export; a decline in technological innovation or government monetary policy such as a devaluation
of the domestic currency." An example of a pertinent external factor is a
depression in world markets and an upward spiral in the prices of the
country's imports. An example of an interaction of internal and external
factors giving rise to a balance-of-payment crisis would be political upheaval in a country that precipitates a massive withdrawal of investments
from a country. In this respect, an illustrative account of the interaction
At all times, at least notionally, the capital and the current must balance. See
supra note 3, at 614.
WASSERMAN & WARE, supra note 3, at 162.
7.
Id.
8.
Chantal Thomas, Balance-of-Payments Crises in the Developing World: Balancing
9.
Trade, Finance and Development in the New Economic Order, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1250,
6.

SAMUELSON,

1252 (2000).
10.
It is of course increasingly difficult to distinguish between domestic and international factors given their increased interconnectedness.
W.M. SCAMMELL, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY POLICY 33 (2d ed. 1961).
11.
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between those factors culminating in Thailand's 1997 balance-ofpayment difficulties is offered by Chantal Thomas:
[A] government policy of maintaining a strong currency made
exports less competitive and created deficits in the mid-1990s.
Finally, increasing acute concerns about the domestic banking
system caused investors in 1997 to exchange their Thai assets
for non-Thai assets en masse. The difficulties faced by an overleveraged banking system created an investor exodus from Thai
capital 12markets ... In short, a severe balance-of-payments crisis
struck.

Thailand's situation and its response to the balance-of-payment difficulty-in this case, the maintenance of an unsupportable exchange rate
for its currency-lead to the question of policy options. In other words,
what responses are usually adopted by a country to counter a balance-ofpayment difficulty? Frieder Roessler's "tree of policy alternatives"
broadly categorizing the available options as either "internal measures"
or "external measures" is illuminating. 3 Comparing those two primary
forms of responses, Roessler views selective external measures as being
problematic given that they:
[I]ntroduce costly distortions in the countries' economies, jeopardize the result of past trade liberalization efforts and make
future progress in the removal of trade barriers more difficult...
selective measures impeding trade can spark off a spiral of retaliatory moves which-as
the 1930s have demonstrated-can
4
suffocate world trade.'
Quantitative restrictions,"' such as those permissible under certain conditions in the WTO framework, 6 fall under the category of selective
12.
Thomas, supra note 9, at 1253.
13.
Frieder Roessler, Selective Balance-of-Payments Adjustment Measures Affecting
Trade: The Roles of the GATT and the IMF, 9 J. WORLD TRADE L. 622 (1975).
14.
Id. at 623.
15.
The term "quantitative restrictions" is, in some ways, a generic term encompassing
other measures such as import surcharges. See Christian Vincke, Trade Restrictionsfor Balance of Payments Reasons and the GATT- Quotas v. Surcharges, 13 HARV. INT'L L.J. 289
(1972). Note, however, that throughout this note the term is used as an import quota.
16.
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, arts. XVI, XVIII, 61
Stat. A-I1, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947]. As a result of the Uruguay Round, the GATT 1947 has been incorporated into the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex IA, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter GATT 1994]. The Marrakesh Agreement also contains the Understanding on the Interpretation of the Balance-of-Payment Provisions of GATT
1994 [hereinafter The Understanding] and created the institutional body known as the World
Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO].
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external measures employed by countries for countering a balance-ofpayment disequilibrium. As will be seen, such quantitative restrictions,
depending on how they are framed, could either be viewed as a monetary
policy or trade policy with attendant jurisdictional implications.
7
B. The JurisdictionalQuestionsfaced by the Fund

1. The Raison d'etre of the Fund
The recognition that a balance-of-payment disequilibrium was inimical to the international financial regime, and further, the lack of a
coherent international response to the problem, were central factors leading to the formation of the Fund. 8 "The creation of the International
Monetary Fund," opines Margaret De Vries, "established an entirely new
framework for balance of payments adjustment."' 9 Whereas the previous
system for attaining balance-of-payment equilibrium was hinged on the
gold standard, ° the objective of the system heralded by the Fund was
described as being:
[T]o simultaneously attain and maintain internal equilibrium
(full employment) and external equilibrium (balance of payments equilibrium). Internal equilibrium was to be obtained by
fiscal and monetary policy. Balance of payments adjustment was
to be effected by (1) changes in exchange rates, (2) use of reserves, supplemented by the temporary use of the secondary line
of reserves furnished by the Fund's resources while adjustment
was being effected, (3) limited use of restrictions on exchange
transactions, and (4) where necessary, restrictions on capital
flows.2'
The foregoing system underscored a preference for a multilateral approach, as opposed to a unilateral one, in confronting a balance-ofpayment disequilibrium. The Fund's resources, it was envisaged, could
17.
For the leading work analyzing and setting out the background details of the Fund's
formation, see THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 1945-1965: TWENTY YEARS OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION (J. Keith Horsefield ed., 1969) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION].

18.
See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 22, 1944, 60
Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 as amended through June 28, 1990 [hereinafter Charter of the Fund].
19.

MARGARET GARRITSEN DE VRIES, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ADJUSTMENT, 1945 TO

1986: THE IMF EXPERIENCE 9 (1987).
20.
JOSEPH GOLD, 2 LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY SYSTEM: SELECTED ESSAYS 74 (1984).
21.
DE VRIES, supra note 19, 9-10. Article IV:2 of the Charter of the Fund enjoins each
Member of the Fund to: "[S]eek to promote stability by fostering orderly underlying economic
and financial conditions and a monetary system that does not tend to produce erratic disruptions." See Charter of the Fund, supra note 18, art. IV:2.
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be applied to forestall a situation whereby a country's unilateral response
to its balance-of-payment difficulty threatened to endanger the international financial regime.
2. Attitude of the Fund Towards the Emergence of the GATr

3

The precursor to the GATT, the International Trade Organization
(ITO), was intended as one of the Bretton Woods institutions. This,
however, was not to be the case, as the United States, a key proponent of
the Charter of the ITO eventually failed to ratify it." What is instructive
is that the interlocking between, on the one hand commercial policy that
the ITO was intended to regulate, and on the other exchange policy to be
supervised by the Fund, was not lost on the designers of those economic
institutions. Thus, Clair Wilcox observes:
It is the purpose of the International Monetary Fund, by contributing to the stabilization of currencies, to bring about the
eventual elimination of exchange controls. But there would be
little point in abolishingnational regulation of the use of monies
if freedom to license imports were retained. For any restriction
that a nation was forbidden to accomplish by regulating its exchanges, it could effect with equal certainty by imposing a quota
system of its trade. Unless quantitative restrictions, as well as
exchange controls, are brought under internationalsupervision,
the purpose of the fund can be circumvented with the greatestof
ease. Unless the fund is supported by the ITO, its possible contribution to the restoration of a freer trading system will be
insignificant ... The future of the fund is thus dependent upon
the establishment and operation of the ITO. 6
With this potential for concurrent jurisdiction between the Fund and
the ITO in terms of measures affecting trade, the Fund took more than a
passing interest in the ITO even at the proposal stage. De Vries provides
22.
See Stephen Silard, The Impact of the InternationalMonetary Fund on International Trade, 2 J. WORLD TRADE L. 129 (1968).
23.
The expression "the GATT" is employed to refer to the institution that was in fact in
existence prior to the formation of the World Trade Organization (the WTO). The GATT administered the GATT 1947. Note that by a curious drafting technique, the GATT 1947 is
distinct from the GATT 1994. This is so notwithstanding the fact that it is applied as part of
the GATT 1994; see supra note 16.
24.
See generally, Peter Kenen & Barry Eichengreen, Managing the World Economy
under the Bretton Woods System: An Overview, in MANAGING THE WORLD ECONOMY: FIFTY
YEARS AFTER THE BRETTON WOODS 5 (Peter Kenen ed., 1994).
25.
The details of the controversy surrounding the adoption of the Charter of the ITO
might be gleaned from ROBERT HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 21-22 (1990).
26.
CLAIR WILCOX, A CHARTER OF WORLD TRADE 211 (1972) (emphasis added).
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us with an insight into the Fund's ambivalence towards the ITO in its
nascent stages when she notes:
The Fund's acute interest in whatever plans were drawn up was
immediately made clear by the Executive Directors. The field of
activity of the proposed ITO would, at the least, run parallel to
that of the Fund. It might even be formulated as to encroach
upon the Fund's responsibilities; indeed the rules of the ITO
might provide for its members a means of escape from the jurisdiction of the Fund. In either case, the Fund's influence would
be impaired. How to prevent this formed a major preoccupation
of the Executive Directorsas they considered the Fund's participation in the PreparatoryCommittee's sessions.27
From the earliest opportunity, therefore, the Fund was ill-disposed
towards yielding any jurisdictional space to the ITO, more so given the
potential impairment of its influence such an action would entail. Although the ITO subsequently failed to materialize, De Vries further
notes, that "fortunately for the Fund, many of the relationships with the
Fund that had been so carefully defined for the proposed ITO were retained in the GATT. ' 28 Going by that account, it is arguable that with the
demise of the ITO, the template hitherto envisaged for the Fund-ITO
relationship then became applicable to the Fund-GATT relationship.
This, perhaps, signals the incipient stages of a jurisdictional quagmire on
balance-of-payment measures between the Fund and what later became
the GATT. This Note now turns to examine the specific provisions that
govern the permissible fiscal measures a Member of the Fund might
adopt in order to restore balance-of-payment equilibrium.
3. Capital and Current Accounts in the Fund
There are a number of provisions in the Charter of the Fund that signal the institutional attitude towards measures that a Member might
adopt in order to restore equilibrium to the component aspects of its balance-of-payment. Thus, in respect of current accounts, the following
provision titled: "Avoidance of Restrictions on Current Payments" is pertinent and states in part:

27.

Margaret G. de Vries, Collaboratingwith the GATT, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
17, 332, 333 (emphasis added). De Vries also points out that "the

COOPERATION, supra note

activities of the Fund's representative at these preparatory sessions helped to ensure that the
charter of the ITO would be compatible with the Fund's interests." Id. at 334 (emphasis
added). See also GILARD HEXNER, THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE AND
THE MONETARY FUND

28.

432--64 (1950-51).

De Vries, supra note 27, at 334 (emphasis added).
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(a) Subject to the provisions of Article VII, Section 3(b) and Article XIV, Section 2, no member shall, without the approval of
the Fund, impose restrictions on the making of payments and
transfers for current international transactions 9
Regarding capital accounts, the Charter of the Fund states:
Members may exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate
international capital movements, but no member may exercise
these controls in a manner which will restrict payments for current transactions or which will unduly delay transfer funds in
settlement of commitments. °
When read together, those two key provisions in the Charter of the Fund
relating to the component aspects of a Member's balance-of-payment
suggest at least that the approach adopted in respect of the current account is distinguishable from that adopted in connection with the capital
account. Whereas, in respect of what is regarded as current international
transactions (current account transactions), restrictions are ab initio disallowed (subject to limited exceptions); in respect of the capital account,
the reverse is the case-restrictions are maintainable (again, subject to
limited exceptions).31 Given this difference in the treatment of the two
accounts, a distinction between what falls within their respective ambits
appears crucial.
Furthermore, Article XXX of the Charter of the Fund provides a list
of transactions considered "current" such that restrictions in those areas
by Members are not permissible. That is to say, so long as the transaction
in question reflects in nature those itemized under Article XXX of the
Charter of the Fund, they would be considered current and afortiori,not
to be subjected to any restrictions. In part, those transactions envisage
"all payments due in connection with foreign trade."3 2 The phrase, "all
29.
Charter of the Fund, supra note 18, at art. VII:2. However, note the exceptions mentioned id. at art. VI:3 (b) and art. XIV:2. Those exceptions recognize instances that may
warrant the imposition of restrictions on current international transactions.
30.
Id. at art. VI:3.
31.
However, James Evans Jr., argues that the provisions contained in Article VI:3 of
the Charter of the Fund are superfluous, in so far as they relate to current transactions given
that they add nothing new to that already provided for under Article VIII:2 of the Charter of
the Fund. See, James Evans Jr., Current and Capital Transactions: How the Fund Defines
Them, 5 FIN. & DEv. 31 (1968). A further rigorous examination of the phrase, "exchange restriction" and thus what might be characterized as a "current international transaction" coming
within the Fund's jurisdiction is that contained in the following piece: Hans Aufricht, Exchange Restrictions under the FundAgreement, 2 J. WORLD TRADE L. 298 (1968).
32.
The phrase "current international transactions" is defined in part as:
(1)

All payments due in connection with foreign trade, other current business, including services, and normal short term banking and credit facilities;
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payments due in connection with foreign trade" is instructive in that it
suggests that Members are prohibited from restricting all payments arising in the course of their trade inter se. As Joseph Gold explains:
A resident of country X can decide to enter into a current international transaction with a resident of country Y, who offers the
most favorable terms, in the confidence that the proceeds of the
transactionthat the resident of X is to receive will not be blocked
or restrictedin any way by country Y.33
In sum, it might be noted, restrictions here and consequently, the jurisdiction of the Fund pertains more to "exchange restrictions" that
might impede the flow of trade between its Members. On the other hand,
restrictions pertaining to goods and services were to be outside the purview of the Fund's jurisdiction.
4. The Fund's Distinction Between Balance-of-Payment
Accounts and Trade Policy
The difficult question here concerns how to deal with a trade policy
measure, such as an import restriction, that is arguably beyond the purview of what might be regarded as an exchange action as such, but
which nevertheless causes exchange repercussions. Is such an "import
restriction" resonating in the balance-of-payment to be viewed as an exchange action, such that the Fund assumes jurisdictional competence?
Or, should it be deemed as a trade action, notwithstanding its attendant
exchange repercussions such that the Fund cedes jurisdictional competence to the WTO? Indeed, could such an import restriction be deemed
as both an exchange action and, at the same time, a trade action? If so,
what consequences will arise, given the separate jurisdictional arrangement between the Fund and the WTO over balance-of-payment?
The Fund by 1952 was already confronted with the intersectional issues arising here. This arose in connection with the Fund's attempt to
define restrictions for the purpose of Article VIII:2 of the Charter of the
Fund. Gold's account of this episode is illuminating because it reveals
the relevant tensions at play. He states:
The question of the definition of restrictions for the purposes of
Article VIII section 2 was raised as a problem of interpretation
in 1951. There were forces pulling in opposite directions: some
(2)

payments due as interest on loans and as net income from other investments

(4)

moderate remittances for family living expenses.

See Charter of the Fund, supra note 18, at art. XXX.
33.
GOLD, supra note 20, at 171 (emphasis added).
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wished to arrive at a definition that would make it clear that the
Fund'sjurisdictiondid not embrace restrictions on trade, even if
they were imposed for balance of payments reasons, because
these were within the competence of the Contracting Parties to
the GATT, whereas others were troubled by the fact that this
might limit the competence of the Fund in connection with members' balances of payments. There was a division of opinion on
the primary question of definition and therefore no agreement on
the secondary question whether the same measure might be a restriction on both payments under the Funds Articles and on
trade under the GATT. The differences
34 of opinion could not be
out.
petered
discussion
and
reconciled
By 1959, however, a staff study initiated by the Fund suggested three
possible approaches as a way out: First, a measure could be deemed to
be a restriction on payments if it was intended to influence the balanceof-payment. Second, the effect of the measure was to be the sole consideration. That is to say, if the measure, either directly or indirectly,
affected international payments, it would be regarded as a payments restriction and accordingly, fall within the Fund's jurisdictional
competence. Third, the technique employed in formulating the trade
measure was to be another relevant factor. By the technique method, it
was meant that:
[I]f the measure was so formulated and made to operate as to affect directly the availability or use of exchange it would be
considered an exchange restriction. If other techniques were
used (for example, an import tariff) the measure under this criterion would not be regarded as an exchange restriction even if the
motive was balance of payments oriented and the effect was to
restrict indirectly payments.35
In the end, the Fund preferred the technique criterion over the other two
possible approaches. "Either of the other approaches," it was reasoned,
"would have resulted unavoidably in a very considerable coincidence of
jurisdiction for the two organizations. ' 3 6 Consequently, in adopting the
technique criterion, the Fund decided that:
The guiding principle in ascertaining whether a measure is a restriction on payments and transfers for current transactions under
34.
Joseph Gold, The Code
supra note 17, 547, 553 (emphasis
35.
Roessler, supra note 13,
36.
GOLD, supra note 34, at

of Conduct, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION,
added).
at 640.
554.
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Article VIII, Section 2, is whether it involves a direct governmental limitation on the availability of or use of exchange as such.37
What thus emerged from the Fund's cartographic exercise was that
the geographical contour of WTO's jurisdictional space revealed a congruence with that of the Fund save only that the method employed by the
Member in addressing the balance-of-payment difficulty determined
which of those institutions would assume jurisdiction. Just what type of
government measures envisaged by the Fund's test is not clearly stated.
The key word, however, is "direct." Thus, if a government measure in
response to a balance-of-payment difficulty directly affected the use of
exchange, it appears that the Fund could assume jurisdiction over such a
measure. Conversely, where the government measure implicitly limited
exchange usage, the Fund would lack jurisdiction notwithstanding the
exchange repercussions of the measure.
II. THE

FUND IN

GATT/WTO

JURISPRUDENCE

38

A. The GAIT!WTO Legal Frameworkon Balance-of-Payment
The primary legal provisions concerning balance-of-payment in the
GAT'/WTO are contained in Articles XII, XV, and XVIII GATT 1994. 39
Those provisions are set out in a labyrinthine order as if to dissuade their
usage. To shed light on those provisions, however, this Note shall proceed
Id. (quoting E.B Decision No. 1034-(60/27)). Gold praises this approach as being
37.
"an example of self-imposed discipline" on the part of the Fund. Id. at 555. Cf with Roessler
who-although conceding that the technique method might be the only acceptable approach
given institutional arrangements-nevertheless points out:
A country that regulates its foreign trade through the banking system and therefore
tends to take currency measures, and a country that uses its customs administration
to control foreign trade and therefore tends to trade measures, should be subject to
the same obligations. It seems unjustified that the internal administrative organization of foreign trade should determine whether a country is subject to the Fund's or
the GATT's jurisdiction.
Roessler, supra note 13, at 642.
The expression, "GATT/WTO" is used as a matter of convenience in this section
38.
indicating that the discussion cuts across two periods. The first period discusses how the
GATT confronted the jurisdictional dilemma relating to balance-of-payment. The later period
discusses the era of the WTO. In actual fact, the GATT later metamorphosed into the WTO
such that in principle, even though not exactly the same institutional body, the WTO is the
subject of the present discussion as well.
Others relevant documents include The Understanding and the Additional Articles
39.
to Article XVIII: B of the GAIT 1994, both part of the Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 16,
the Declaration on the Relationship of the World Trade Organization and the International
Monetary Fund, WTO Doc. WT/L/194, and the 1979 Declaration on Trade Measures taken for
Balance-of-Payments Purposes, Nov. 28, 1979, BISD 265/205-207.
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as follows: First, the preliminary issue of whether there exists in the
GATT/WTO framework a criteria for distinguishing between a "trade
action" per se and an "exchange action" in the same manner as obtainable in the Fund is considered. Thereafter, by a case analysis, namely,
the India-QuantitativeRestriction case, 0 the key aspects of the balance-

of-payment provisions are examined with particular reference to considerations surrounding the Fund's role in the WTO.
B. Trade and an Exchange Action in the GATT/WTO

As early as 1952, a GATT panel had to decide the question of how to
construe what was termed "a special contribution" levied by Greece on
some imported products.4 ' It was the contention of the Greek delegation
that the said contribution was analogous to:
[A] charge imposed on foreign exchange allocated for the importation of goods from abroad equivalent to a multiple currency
practice, which measure was considered by the Greek government as indispensable to cover the constantly widening gap
between the official exchange rate of the drachma ... and the ef-

fective purchasing power of the drachma.42
The difficulty here related to how to characterize the Greek import
measure: Whether to construe the Greek measure as a trade measure, and
accordingly, within the jurisdictional competence of the GATT panel, or
whether to consider it an exchange measure, in which case it would have
been within the jurisdictional competence of the Fund. The panel framed
the issue before it in this way:
[T]he principal question arising for determination was whether
or not the Greek tax was an internal tax or charge on imported
products within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article III. If the
finding on this point were affirmative, the Panel considered that
it would be subject to the provisions of Article III whatever
might have been the underlying intent of the Greek Government
in imposing the tax ... On the other hand, if the contention of

the Greek Government were accepted that the tax was not in nature of a tax or charge on imported goods, but was a tax on
foreign exchange allocated for the payment of imports, the question would arise whether this was a multiple currency practice,
and, if so, whether it was in conformity with the Articles of
40.
India-Quantitative Restrictions, supra note 1.
41.
Panel Report, Special Import Taxes Instituted by Greece, GATT Doc. G25-1S/48
(Nov. 3, 1952).
42.

Id. 2.
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Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. These matters
would be for the determination of the International Monetary
Fund . 3
In the end, the panel refrained from making a pronouncement on the
matter, preferring rather to direct the Contracting Parties" to the GATT
to seek further information from the Fund regarding how to construe this
Greek "special contribution." By refusing to specifically pronounce on
the nature of the Greek measure, the GATT panel lost an opportunity to
contribute to the jurisprudence relating to the demarcation lines of meas45
ures that reflect an admixture of trade and incidental fiscal components.
In 1954, a Special Sub-Group conducting a review of GATT balance-of-payment vis-gi-vis GATT and Fund relations concluded that:
[I]n many instances it was difficult or impossible to define
clearly whether a government measure is financial or trade in
character andfrequently it is both" ... the division of work be-

tween the Contracting Parties and the Fund was in practice
"based on the technical nature of government measures rather
than on the effect of these measures on international trade and
finance.46
By 1981, a Secretariat Background Paper had to address an issue
reminiscent of that which arose before the GATT panel on Greek import
measures. Here, the measure concerned Italian deposit requirements for
purchases of foreign currency. The Secretariat Background paper to the
consultation noted:
If the distinction between import and payments measures were
made by taking into account the purpose or the effect of the action, the Italian scheme would probably be both a trade and an
exchange measure: it is intended to improve Italy's payments position as well as to restrain imports, and it has had an impact both
on payments for imports and imports themselves. If however the
5, 7-8.
Id.
43.
This term "Contracting Parties" has assumed a technical meaning in that it is used
44.
to refer to the GATT Members.
It is perhaps interesting to reflect on the possible consequences of the panel decid45.
ing this matter one way or the other. This is especially so given that the issue confronting the
panel preceded the Fund's decision to adopt the technique method in determining whether it
had jurisdiction over a balance-of-payment measure or not. Whether the panel's decision
would have influenced the outcome of the Fund's study is conjectural but it could have been a
component aspect of its consideration in determining what would guide it in assuming jurisdiction over balance-of-payment measures.
GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX, Vol. I, 435 (1989) (quoting in part GATT Doc.
46.
L/332/Rev. I and Addenda, March 2, 4, 5, 1955, 3S/170, 196, 2) (emphasis added).
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distinction were made by looking at the restrictive technique
used, the Italian deposit scheme would probably have to be regarded as an exchange measure since it is formulated and
operated as a requirement to be fulfilled for the purchase of foreign exchange rather than importation.47
By this time, the influence of the Fund's guiding principle on the Secretariat's Background paper was obvious. The reference to "looking at the
restrictive technique used" was nothing more than another variant formulation of the "technique method" adopted by the Fund to resolve the
questions of jurisdictional competence over balance-of-payment measures.
In the absence of any coherent GATT principles for resolving trade
questions with attendant payment repercussions, the Fund's principles, it
seems, were drafted to resolve such matters. The GATT's perceived disinclination towards regulating a trade matter with an attendant exchange
component begs the question of whether indeed the Fund is better suited
to deal with the incidental trade component of such exchange measures.
The measures discussed here, be it the Greek or the Italian measures,
surely reveal trade repercussions. And nothing so far suggests that the
Fund, conversely, sufficiently collaborates with the GATT/WTO in
reaching decisions on the trade elements of exchange actions.
C. The Role of the Fund in GATT/WTO:
The India-Quantitative Restriction Case Revisited
1. Facts
The facts leading to this dispute may be summarized as follows: India maintained quantitative restrictions on imports of products falling in
2,714 tariff lines for which it claimed balance-of-payment justification.48
Accordingly, it notified the Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions (Committee)4 9 of these restrictions as required of a Member
undertaking such measures. Consultations on those restrictions convened
intermittently from 195750 and culminated in the last one held on July 1,
47.
Id. (quoting GATT Doc. BOP/W/51, at 4, In 9-10).
48.
India--Quantitative Restrictions, supra note 1, 2.1.
49.
The Committee, going by the Understanding, is the body charged in the WTO with
the responsibility of conducting "consultations in order to review all restrictive import measures taken for balance-of-payment purposes'" See The Understanding, supra note 16, 5.
Membership of the Committee is open to all Members indicating their wish to serve on it.
50.
Full consultations on those restrictions commenced on 6 and 8 December 1995.
Further, in January 1997, consultations were resumed. The consultations were held in May,
June, and July, without consensus on the issue of whether India's balance-of-payment situation warranted the imposition of quantitative restrictions. This was so notwithstanding the
revised schedule put forward by India for the complete withdrawal of those restrictions. In
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1997. In between those years, improvements in India's balance-ofpayment enabled it drop some of the restrictions whilst retaining some
others. Nevertheless, some Members argued that India's balance-ofpayment situation no longer warranted the maintenance of even the remaining restrictions. This latter view was bolstered mainly by the
opinion of the Fund, expressed at various times in the course of those
consultations. It was the opinion of the Fund that the restrictions maintained by India would be unnecessary in a shorter time frame than that
preferred by India.' In effect, the disagreement here was more on the
time frame for the removal of the restrictions and not really on whether
India could maintain them ad infinitum. In the end, the Members could
not reach a consensus on the issue. The ensuing stalemate led the United
States to invoke the dispute settlement procedures in the WTO.
2. The Arguments
a. The Arguments made by the United States
The claim brought by the United States centered on its contention
that the quantitative restrictions maintained by India amounted to a
breach of the latter's treaty obligations. The United States advanced a
twofold argument: First, it argued that the restrictions maintained by India could not come within the envisaged exceptions to quantitative
restrictions recognized under Article XVII:B GATT 1994.52 In support
of that argument, the United States urged the panel to accept the determinations and findings of the Fund as conclusively settling the matter of
whether India indeed faced a balance-of-payment difficulty. Second, it
sought to rely on one of the multilateral agreements to the WTO Agreement, namely, the Agreement on Agriculture,53 to argue that restrictions
maintained under India's licensing requirements were nevertheless to be
considered quantitative restrictions. This was so, the United States maintained, as long as those import license requirements operated in reality as
an "import ban, or close to it." Thus, the United States urged the panel
to require India to bring its measures in line with its treaty obligations by
removing the restrictions in issue.

some Member's view, the schedule was unduly prolonged and was not borne out by India's
economic situation. See India--Quantitative Restrictions, supra note 1,H 2.2-2.7.
Id. 2.6.
51.
See figure 2:0 infra.
52.
Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 1A to the Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 16.
53.
India--Quantitative Restrictions, supra note 1, 3.10.
54.
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b. India's Arguments
India's reply to the arguments of the United States might be divided
into two parts; one substantive and one procedural. In respect of the substantive element of its defense, India argued that, contrary to the United
States contention, the quantitative restrictions came within the exceptions contemplated in Article XVIII:9 and XVIII:11 GATT 1994. In
effect, India disagreed with the conclusions reached by the Fund's factual review of the state of its balance-of-payment. 5 Further, it argued that
Article XI GATT 1994 was inapplicable to the matter brought before the
panel, for this section did not govern the maintenance of quantitative
restrictions for balance-of-payments reasons. 56
Moreover, India pointed out that the Agreement on Agriculture was
also inapplicable to quantitative restrictions maintained by a Member for
balance-of-payments purposes. Regarding the procedural plank of its
57
defense, India argued that so long as the General Council of the WT0
had not pronounced on the status of the quantitative restrictions, it was
improper for either the dispute settlement panel or the Fund to reach a
conclusion on the question. Implicit in India's argument, therefore, was
that the United States could not invoke the dispute settlement procedure
to challenge the quantitative restriction, because the Committee or the
General Council of the WTO had yet to pronounce on their validity. This
position by India thus conflicted with the contention of the United States
that the Fund's findings on balance-of-payment were definitive. In sum,
India sought to show that the WTO had the final say on the state of a
Member's balance-of-payment and not the Fund. Consequently, India
urged the panel to reject the claim brought by the United States and to
deny the relief sought.
3. The Decision
In its decision, the panel considered the procedural issue raised by
India, namely, whether the claim brought by the United States was, in
the first place, properly before it. That is to say, whether, in respect of
the question concerning the true state of India's balance-of-payment, it
was the Committee and the General Council-and not the panel-that
had the competence to decide the matter. On that procedural question,
the panel came to the conclusion that it would run counter to the objective of the WTO Agreement to deprive Members of their right to invoke
55.
Id. [ 3.228-238.
56.
Id. [3.7.
57.
The General Council of the WTO is composed of representatives of all the Members and acts in the interval before the meeting of the highest decision body in the WTO,
namely, the Ministerial Conference. See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 16, at art. IV:2.
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dispute settlement procedures." "It would be inconsistent with the object
and purpose of the WTO Agreement," said the panel, "to interpret the
relevant provisions as precluding panels from reviewing the justification
of measures taken for balance-of-payment purposes[.]"5 9 Along that line
of reasoning, the panel viewed the Committee's role as being "complementary" to its own adjudicatory functions.6°
Further, on the substantive matter of whether India's balance-ofpayment situation warranted the imposition of quantitative restrictions,
the panel, relying mainly on the evidence furnished it by the Fund, concluded that "India's balance of payments situation was not such as to
allow the maintenance of measures for balance of payments purposes
under the terms of Article XVIII:9"'"" In doing so, the panel upheld the
claim brought by the United States and in its recommendations, required
India to bring its measures into conformity with its treaty obligations
under the WTO Agreement. On appeal, the conclusions reached by the
panel were affirmed, with the Appellate Body reiterating the panel's ruling that India bring its measures into conformity with its treaty
obligations.
D. Selected Issues in the India-QuantitativeRestriction Case
1. Whether to Receive the Fund's Opinion as Required
Under Article XV GATT 1994
The United States argued that the panel was required, in all cases
concerning monetary reserves, balance-of-payments, and foreign exchange arrangements, to consult with the Fund.62 This was so, in the
view of the United States, notwithstanding that Article XV GATT 1994
mentions contracting parties rather than panels.63 India insisted on a
somewhat unclear distinction between "contracting parties" and "panels"
in arguing that based on a notion of institutional balance, it was the forthe Fund. 64
mer-the contracting parties-that were required to consult
Much of the confusion here arose in connection with the interpretation to be ac58.
corded to the provisions stipulated in footnote 1 of the Understanding. India argued that
footnote 1 of the Understanding suggested a distinction between the "justification" and the
"application" of measures imposed by a Member for balance-of-payment purposes. In India's
view, therefore, the "justification" of its measures was a matter not yet determined by the
Committee and therefore it implicitly argued that it was premature to invoke dispute settlement measures. The United States vigorously opposed that argument saying that it was
tantamount to denying dispute settlement rights accorded under the WTO Agreement.
India--Quantitative Restrictions, supra note 1, 5.101.
59.
Id. 15.92.
60.
Id. 5.236.
61.
Id. 13.305.
62.
Id.
63.
Id. $ 3.306.
64.
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In deciding the issue of whether it was required to consult the Fund
because of the requirement contained in Article XV GATT 1994, the
panel side-stepped this issue by choosing rather to act pursuant to the
provision of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) 6 which allowed it to seek expert opinion. In the panel's view:
We find that whatever the interpretation of Article XV:2 of
GATT 1994, Article 13:1 of the DSU entitles the Panel to consult with the IMF in order to obtain any relevant information
relating to India's monetary reserves and balance-of-payments
situation which would assist us in assessing the claims submitted
tUS66
to us. 6
Although it reached the correct conclusion, it is submitted that the
panel misconstrued the question before it. This led the panel thus to fall
into the error of conveying the impression that by relying on Article 13:1
DSU, it could exercise discretion whether to seek evidence from the
Fund or not.
To be sure, Article 13:1 DSU may of course be invoked where expert
opinion is warranted. Once the subject areas mentioned under Article
XV:2 GATT 1994 arise before a panel for determination, however, it is
mandatory for the panel to seek the Fund's opinion. This is so, because
the operative phrase in Article XV:2 GATT 1994 provides in part that:
"in all cases ... concerning monetary reserves, balance of payments or
foreign exchange arrangements ... [the Contracting Party] shall consult
fully with the International Monetary Fund." As a result, Article 13:1
DSU, relied on by the panel, will not necessarily apply given that the
question brought before it was clearly one of those mentioned under Article XV:2 GATT 1994. The position advanced by the United States thus
mirrored better the requirement contained in Article XV: 2 GATT 1994.
Accordingly, be it a developing or a developed Member of the WTO, the
Fund will at all times be involved in the scrutiny of its balance-ofpayment situation.

65.
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 16, Annex 2 [hereinafter DSU].
66.
India--Quantitative Restrictions, supra note 1, 5.12.
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2. The Scope of the Information Which a Panel
Faced with the Question of a Member's
Balance-of-Payment Situation May Consider
India sought to delimit the scope of the information that the Fund
could validly furnish the Committee or a panel asked to assess a
Member's balance-of-payment situation. 67 The issue here related to the
meaning to be accorded the provision of Article XV:2 GATT 1994. That
is to say, should the information obtained from the Fund regarding the
state of a Member's balance-of-payment be solely of a statistical nature
or could it in addition include an evaluation of the statistical information?
The panel refrained from addressing this issue specifically but rather
seemed to assume that the nature of the information required from the
Fund entailed not merely the production of statistical data, but also an
evaluation of that data. That the panel adopted that approach may be inferred from the nature of the questions posed to the Fund in the course of
the proceedings and the replies thereto. For example, the panel posed the
following question to the Fund:
Noting that these restrictions relate mainly to consumption
goods, would relaxation or removal of the restrictions ... have
been likely to produce thereupon
conditions justifying the inten6
sification... of restrictions?
To this question, the Fund proffered the following answer:
The Fund's view remains as indicated in the statement to the
WTO Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions ...
namely, that the external situation can be managed using macroeconomic policy instruments alone. Quantitative restrictions
(QR) are not shoud
neededbfor
balance-of-payments
adjustment
and
remvedovera
".
•69
should be removed over a relatively shortperiod of time.
From the standpoint of the Fund, the question regarding the scope of
the information to be furnished GATT/WTO had long since been settled.
In that regard, De Vries notes:
Should the Fund supply to the GATT only facts, especially statistical material, or should an evaluation and conclusions,
particularly conclusions passed by the Fund's Board, be transmitted as well? Eventually these had to be answered by vote.
The Board decided that the Fund was to supply to the GATT not
67.
68.
69.

Id. 3.356.
Id. 3.366.
Id. 3.366-67 (emphasis added).
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only relevant statisticaldata but also conclusions as to the current need for restrictions.The information supplied to the GATT
on behalf of the Fund thus covered the restrictive systems and
the balance of payments and presented analyses of the causes
and effects of the import restrictions... of each country.70
A closer examination of this issue, however, entails revisiting the requirements of Article XV:2 GATT 1994. It substantially provides as
follows:
In all cases in which the Contracting Parties are called upon to
consider or deal with problems concerning monetary reserves,
balances of payments or foreign exchange arrangements, they
shall consult fully with the International Monetary Fund. In such
consultations, the Contracting Parties shall accept allfindings of
statistical and otherfacts presented by the Fund relating to foreign exchange, monetary reserves and balances of payments ...
The Contracting Parties in reaching theirfinal decision in cases
involving the criteria set forth in paragraph2 (a) of Article XII
or in paragraph9 of Article XVIII, shall accept the determination of the Fund as to what constitutes a serious decline in the
contracting party's monetary reserves, a very low level of its
monetary reserves or a reasonable rate of increase in its monetary reserves, as to the financialaspects of other matters covered
in consultation in such cases. 71
Two considerations may flow from this provision in connection with the
question as to the scope of the information that GATT/WTO may receive
from the Fund: First, in respect of consultations involving, for example,
balance-of-payment, GATT/WTO is required to accept all findings of
statisticaland other facts. Thus, that phraseology, at least initially, suggests that in consultations concerning balance-of-payment, the Fund is
limited to providing statistical data and nothing more. The wording "and
other facts" curtails a definite conclusion in this aspect, however. But, if
a well known canon of statutory interpretation is followed, the phrase
"and other facts" can only be read in the light of the special wordsfindings of statistical nature.72 Consequently, those "other facts" must
also be of a statistical nature.

70.
De Vries, supra note 17, 339 (emphasis added).
71.
GATT 1994, supra note 16, at art. XV:2 (emphasis added).
72.
See, the ejusderem generis principle which postulates that wide words associated in
the text with more limited words are taken to be restricted by implication to matters of the

same limited character. FRANCIS

BENNION, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

954-65 (1997).
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Second, the provision notwithstanding its opening portions also
obliges the WTO in the following subject areas, namely, monetary reserves, foreign exchange arrangements, and balance-of-payment, to
accept the determination of the Fund as to the monetary situation of the
Member wishing to invoke it. On this aspect, it may be noted that matters pertaining to either monetary reserves or foreign exchange are, in
the first place, not within the juridical purview of the WTO. They are
subject areas regulated elsewhere-in the Fund. As a result, the obligation on the WTO to accept determinations by the Fund in those subject
areas is a mischaracterization of its juridical powers.
Further, it is obvious that the question of whether a Member may
validly impose a quantitative restriction is necessarily anchored on (or
encompasses) the actual state of its monetary reserves. The right to impose quantitative restrictions arises mainly because a country is
undergoing "monetary" or "payments" problems. In practice, therefore,
it is inconceivable for a conclusion to be reached on that question without an antecedent determination of the state of the Member's monetary
reserves-in which case the Fund's determinations are expressly required and must be accepted when made. In sum, notwithstanding the
opening portion of Article XV GATT 1994 suggesting that the information required from the Fund in balance-of-payment matters shall be
limited to facts of a statistical nature, a more rigorous consideration suggests the opposite-that the Fund may in fact supply not only statistical
data, but in addition to that, an evaluation of those facts.73
The drafting of the provisions of Article XV GATT 1994 is thus inelegant in that it appears to confer powers where none exist, and further,
it conveys an impression of a limitation regarding the information that
the WTO may receive from the Fund-again, where none seems to exist.
One implication of the apparent reluctance by the panel to make a clear
pronouncement on this issue will be to gradually reinforce the impression that the Fund's practice of forwarding both statistical and analytical
data is coterminous with established GATT/WTO practice. The panel's
pronouncement on this issue could have aided in determining whether
indeed such a limitation regarding the scope of the information required
from the Fund in respect of balance-of-payment exists or not.
3. The Question Concerning the True State of a
Member's Balance-of-Payment Position
The United States argued that the findings and the determinations of
the Fund in respect of a Member's balance-of-payment situation should,
73.

See Roessler, supra note 13, at 647 and de Vries, supra note 17, at 343.
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without reference to further evidence, conclusively settle that question.
The relevant portion of Article XV:2 GATT 1994 states:
[Tihe Contracting Parties shall accept all findings of statistical
and other facts presented by the Fund relating to foreign exchange, monetary reserves and balances of payments ...The
Contracting Parties in reaching their final decision in cases involving the criteria set forth in paragraph 2 (a) of Article XII or
in paragraph 9 of Article XVIII, shall accept the determination
of the Fund as to what constitutes a75 serious decline in the contracting party's monetary reserves[.]
Although the panel refrained from making a finding on this issue, it remains very contentious. Two strains of arguments have emerged in this
regard. One argues that recourse to the Fund is not only clearly mandatory, but also conclusively settles the question of whether a Member is
experiencing a balance-of-payment difficulty. In that connection, Deborah Siegel makes the point that:
The use of the term "shall accept" is better read to mean that
these determinations are to be taken as dispositive, as was argued by the United States. This reading would seem to preclude
allowing a variety of expert opinions on the member's balanceof-payments position; that is, the Fund's statement in this regard
is not just another expert opinion to be considered or weighed
against those of other experts. This interpretation not only reflects the plain meaning of the text, but also is supported by the
drafting history of the GATT, which, as noted by the United
States, records a considered decision of the drafters to reject a
proposal (by Australia) to change "shall accept the determination" to "shall give special weight to the opinions of' the Fund.76
Another strain views the matter somewhat differently. In this regard,
Dukgeun Ahn argues:
Considering the expertise and role of the IMF in the world economic system, a better way to balance the inputs by the IMF on
BOP-related issues may be to consider the determination by the
IMF a prima facie case. Thus, as far as the BOP-related issues
are concerned, the determination by the IMF establishes a rebuttable presumption that a BOP measure is, or is not, justified
74.
India--Quantitative Restrictions, supra note 1, 3.305.
75.
GATT 1994, supra note 16, at art. XV:2.
76.
Deborah E. Siegel, Legal Aspects of the IMF/WTO Relationship: The Fund's Articles ofAgreement and the WTO Agreements, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 561, 582 (2002).
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pursuant to the IMF determination. The opposing party to the
IMF determination would then have a burden of proof to refute
the presumption with regard to the justification of BOP meas77
ures.
Siegel's contention is admittedly textually compelling. This contention,
however, should for the following reasons not be accepted. First, the
GATT/WTO history that Siegel draws attention to is helpful because it
sheds light on the ancestry of Article XV:2 GATT 1994 but it should not
supplant current realities. Under the current judicial legal framework and
its attendant dispute settlement mechanism, it would certainly be anachronistic to insist that the drafting history of the former Article XV:2
GATT 1947 suggests that a panel faced with a Member's balance-ofpayment situation should accept, without question or assessment, the
findings and determinations of the Fund.
Second, Siegel makes heavy weather of the fact that implicit in the
phrase "shall accept" is an obligation of the panel to accept the determinations of the Fund regarding a Member's balance-of-payment situation
without recourse to further evidence on that issue. Again, given the textual provisions of Article XV:2 GATT 1994, the argument is not entirely
without merit. The logical extension of that argument, however, seems to
lead to a troubling result-such an argument is bound to collide with the
core fundamental objective any modem dispute settlement process is
meant to achieve. This objective is admirably encapsulated in the DSU
in the following terms:
The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered
agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective
assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and
conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such
other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or 7in
giving the rulings provided for in the covered
8
agreements.
Were the panel to follow the course advocated by Siegel, it would be
tantamount to the panel abandoning the cardinal requirement to conduct
an objective assessment of the matter before it spelt out in the provision.
It is difficult to see how an assessment that consists of the opinion of

77.
Dukgeun Ahn, Linkages between International Financial and Trade Institutions:
The IMF World Bank and the WTO, 34 J. WORLD TRADE 1, 25 (2000).
78.
DSU, supra note 65, at art. 11 (emphasis added).
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only one expert, however definitive, without a corresponding opportunity
of challenging it, can meet the crucial test of an objective assessment.
Consequently, it is submitted that if the requirement in Article XV:2
GATT 1994-"shall accept"-is read in conjunction with that contained
in Article 11 DSU, an interpretation that results in preserving the panel's
ability to conduct an objective assessment should be preferred. The evidence furnished by the Fund should not be an exception to the rule
requiring an objective assessment. A panel can only fulfill that obligation
if it at least conducts an assessment of the Fund's finding and determinations alongside those furnished by other experts. By this process, the
distillation of objective findings will be enhanced and consequently, the
panel's ability to reach a fair and impartial decision will be enhanced as
well.
Fortunately, both the panel and the Appellate Body, if only to a limited scale, seemed to implicitly endorse the approach of considering
alternative views to those of the Fund in reaching conclusions on the
state of a Member's balance-of-payment. In upholding the panel's approach, the Appellate Body declared:
[N]othing in the Panel Report supports India's argument that the
Panel delegated to the IMF its judicial function to make an objective assessment of the matter. A careful reading of the Panel
Report makes clear that the Panel did not simply accept the
views of the IME The Panel critically assessed these views and
also considered other data and opinions in reaching its conclusions.79
Surely, the inclination evinced by the panel and the Appellate Body
towards conducting some assessment of the Fund's opinion alongside
that of other expert opinion conforms not only with the requirements
stipulated under Article 11 DSU, but also with the minimum standards
expected of any panel performing adjudicatory functions.
It is further submitted that the position advanced by Ahn-that the
Fund's determinations and findings be regarded as raising a prima facie
presumption and a fortiori, requiring rebuttal by counter evidence-if
accepted, would impose an unfair evidential burden on a Member asked
to discharge it. This Note rather prefers the position of probative equality
implicit in the objective assessment obligation placed on the panel: the
findings and determinations of the Fund should not be accorded treatment any more favorable than that extended to other available expert
evidence.

79.

Appellate Body Report, supra note 1,

149 (emphasis added).

JuridicalSubstance or Myth

Winter 2005]

Assuming the approach of assessing the Fund's determinations
against those of other experts is followed, it settles the somewhat secondary level question of whether the WTO retains the final word on the
state of a Member's balance-of-payment situation. Of course, it should
be an incidental element of the adjudicatory powers of the panel to retain
the discretion to admit or to disregard evidence brought before it and this
should be so irrespective of whether such evidence emanates from the
determinations of the Fund or not. Any thing less would certainly fail the
test of a fair adjudicatory process.
III.

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE REGULATORY
CONVERGENCE OF THE FUND AND THE

WTO

A. Some PreliminaryMatters
1. Juridical Competence Between the Fund and the WTO
The review in Part II leads to the following representation of the juridical competence of the Fund and the WTO over balance-of-payment
matters:
TABLE

International Institutions
of Regulatory Economic
Governance

3: 0

Notional Juridical
Competence

GATT/WTO

Quantitative Restrictions
(Articles X11
and XVIII GATT
1994)

The Fund

Monetary Matters (Article XV
GATT 1994)

Actual Juridical
Competence
No jurisdiction over
quantitative restrictions
(Article XV GATT 1994
ensures this position).
Jurisdiction inrespect of both
fiscal matters and
quantitative restrictions (a
trade matter). This is so for
the following reasons:
Notwithstanding the 1959
study wherein the Fund
opted for the technique
method-whether the
action taken by the
country involved "adirect
governmental limitation on
the availability of or use of
exchange'-in conceding
juridical space to the WTO
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Actual Juridical
Competence
over trade matters having
balance-of-payment
repercussions, the effect
of Article XV GATT 1994
isto ensure that nothing
was indeed conceded to
the WTO.
Adecision as to whether a
country can impose a
quantitative restrictions rests
on two critical
considerations involving the
Fund:
* A.The supply of statistical
data and its evaluation
and:
* B.The obligation on the
WTO to accept such
statistical evaluation from
the Fund.

2. The Need for the Balance-of-Payment
Exception in GATT/WTO
The initial post war impulse towards quantitative restrictions in general was that they should be eliminated. Thus, as Gardner notes:
There was solid agreement that such restrictions represented a
particularly injurious form of trade barrier... It was also agreed
that they were far more difficult to reconcile with multilateral
principles, since there was no satisfactory
method of assuring
80
their non-discriminatory
appli
ther nn-iscimnatryapplication.
The foregoing apprehensions notwithstanding, quantitative restrictions nevertheless found their way into GATT 1947, albeit after difficult
negotiations. 8' They were, however, to be adopted only as corrective
measures by Members facing balance-of-payment difficulties." What is
instructive in that post war period was the push, principally by the
United Kingdom and other Western European allies devastated by that
80.
81.
82.

Cited in Vincke, supra note 15, at 297.
WILCOX, supra note 26, at 45.
See generally, GATT 1947, at art. XII and XVIII.
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war, to expand those quantitative restriction provisions in the GATT.
Christian Vincke recounts the arguments made by those countries:
At that time the United States was running an $11 billion surplus. On the other hand, Great Britain, for instance, had
accumulated an external debt of $15 billion. Furthermore, the
currencies of the Western European countries were not convertible. Their ruined economies could not or would not (because of
reconstructionpolicies) produce certain goods for which there
was a very high internal demand. Since those goods were available only from the dollar countries, a free international trade
system would have worsened the existing imbalance ...At that

time the necessity for deficit countries to use QR was probably
an obvious and consequently little discussed fact. 3
The parallels evident in this description with the situation in most
developing countries today--especially the least-developing and African
countries-leap to the eye. Most of those developing countries are neck
deep in trade deficit situations.84 In addition, as was then the case of the
United Kingdom and most of Western Europe, these countries lack the
requisite capacity to produce most of the imports that are in high demand
in their respective countries. It does not require a deity to know that an
insistence on the route of liberalizing their markets without a demonstrated productive base could lead to an incurable deficit situation in
those countries. With most developing country Members still engaging
in primary production, the orientation towards liberalization should be
approached with extreme caution if not outright suspicion.
What the decision of the panel, anchored mainly on the Fund's conclusions, signals is that the WTO will curtail developing country
Members' resorting to this necessary exception to limit disproportionate
importation.8 5 The panel's factual review of India's balance-of-payment
situation appeared unmindful of that historical parallel evident in the
post-war period and the economic challenges confronting most developing countries today. The decision certainly imposes pressure on
developing countries to import more-a position that, in the absence of a
significant and measurable improvement in their productive capacity
base, puts their economies under pressure.

83.
84.

Vincke, supra note 15, at 298-9 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
See, "Trade Statistics 2003" especially in relation to Africa, available online at

http://www.wto.org.
85.
Asif H. Qureshi makes a similar point in the well written article: Asif H. Qureshi,
Challenging Quantitative Restrictions for Balance-of-Payments Purposes under the WTO, 6

int. T. L. R. 28, 31 (2000).
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3. The Distinguishing Elements Evident in GATT/WTO
Table 3:1 depicts some of the different characteristics between the
Fund and the WTO.86 The discussion hereunder of the institutional differences between the Fund and the WTO will occasionally refer to Table
3:1:
TABLE 3:1

THE FUND

THE WTO

-The practice of weighted voting remains
the procedure for decision-making.
• No special and differential treatment
principle exists inthe Charter of the Fund
for treating a category of its Members.
• Prohibitions on exchange restrictions
establish obligations that Members owe to
the institution rather than to other
Members.
• May require a Member to remove
restrictions affecting others regardless of
whether a complaint has been submitted
or not.
' The Fund's Executive Board meets in
continuous session to review and reach
decisions on Member's compliance ... in
contrast to WTO panels.
• Incases of persistent violations, the Fund
as an organization has the authority to
impose sanctions, such as withdrawal of
eligibility to use the Fund's general
resources, suspension of voting rights,
and eventual compulsory withdrawal.

e At least notionally, decision is by a process
of one country-one vote. Inpractice,
however, decision making is not by voting
but by consensus"
• Special and differential treatment of
developing country Members.
e Obligations characterized by the reciprocal
nature of the trade obligations that
originated inthe GATT.
• The WTO is an important organization that
facilitates the implementation,
administration, operation of the
agreements and a forum for discussions.
aCreates the mechanism for formal dispute
resolution concerning alleges violations of
WTO rules, but the institution does not
initiate complaints for non-compliance.
• Cannot impose sanctions on Member
failing to comply.

B. Developing Countriesand the Dimensions of Governance
1. The Malaise of Democratic Deficit Afflicting the Fund
The most significant difference emerging from figure 3:1 above is
the asymmetrical power relationship evident in the decision-making
process of the Fund. Whereas in the WTO, Members have equal voting
86.
Figure 3:1 is generated mainly from the description of the differences between the
Fund and the WTO contained in Siegel's article. See, Siegel, supra note 76. Some other distinguishing features of those two institutions have been added, however.
87.
See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 16, at art. IX: 1.
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rights,88 under the Fund, the voting structure is articulated in such a way
as to reflect the strength of its contributors.89 Compared to the position
obtainable in the WTO, this represents a particularly disturbing aspect of
the merger of the Fund and the WTO. 9 A former secretary of the Fund in
addressing aspects of this question of institutional legitimacy noted that:
Fund governance of its system of quotas and voting power has
not been satisfactory because of growing distortions which have
developed over time are only now beginning to be addressed in
discussions in the Board. The system as it exists is geared to defending the status quo, and this has played to the advantage of
Western Europe and to the detriment of Asia and of the developing countries as a group, which is the overwhelming majority of
the Fund members and of the global population. The institutional failure to correct more promptly the inequities in the
distribution of voting power has added to the public perception
of the Fund as being dominated by the Western European and
North American industrialcountries.9'

Absent a significant leap in remedying this observed legitimacy
deficit, the merger portends a clear and present danger that the compara2
tive strength of developing countries in the WTO will be compromised.
To be sure, however, that the WTO is not without its own legitimacy questions. For
88.
example, decision-making in the WTO is by a process of "consensus." The meaning accorded
that term is unclear. Footnote 1 to art. IX: I of the WTO Agreement provides: "The body concerned shall be deemed to have decided by consensus on a matter submitted for its
consideration, if no Member, present at the meeting when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision." Id. at art. IX: 1, n. 1.
Now, the phrase, 'formally objects' is not defined anywhere in the WTO Agreement. This
lack of clarity has led some to suggest that the 'consensus' entails some deference to economic
clout such that the big economic powers can decide a matter one way or the other notwithstanding the theoretical majority of developing countries in the WTO. See JOHN JACKSON,
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE 46 (1998); cf ASIF
H. QURESHI, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 242-243 (1999).
See generally, Transcripts of Economic Forum titled Governing the Fund, Interna89.
tional Monetary Fund (Sept. 17, 2002).
One other indicator of the power dimensions would be the fact that all Chief Execu90.

tive Officers of the Fund have come from developed countries. Note, however, that the current
director of the WTO, Dr. Panitchpakdi Supachai, is from a developing country, namely, Thailand.
Leo Van Houtven, Address at Economic Forum, Governing the Fund (Sept. 17,
91.
2002) (emphasis added). See also, Ngaire Woods, The Challenge to InternationalInstitutions,
in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GLOBALIZATION 217 (Ngaire Woods ed., 2000) (Arguing for

greater legitimacy and transparency as international organizations become more intrusive in
the domestic domain) (emphasis added).
Bernard Hoekman notes a recent expression of this leverage by developing country
92.

members in the Cancun Ministerial Meeting of 10-14 September 2003. See Bernard Hoekman, Cancun: Crisis or Catharsis, note presented at Brookings-George Washington Trade
Roundtable (Sept. 17, 2003).
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Nothing so far suggests that the asymmetrical dimension in the decision
making process of the Fund is about to change. On this score, developing country Members of the WTO should be aware of this danger.
2. The Special and Differential Treatment
of Developing Countries
Table 3:1 further highlights another key lesson that may be drawn
from the India-QuantitativeRestriction case. That is to say, the real danger of eviscerating the special and differential rights accorded to
developing country Members in the WTO. The extension of those rights
to developing countries evidences the WTO's sensitivity to the peculiar
difficulties of those Members as late comers to a trade architecture designed mainly by wealthy nations. Short of those provisions being no
more than mere rhetoric, the close connection of the Fund and the WTO,
at the very least, obscures that carefully articulated arrangement peculiar
to the WTO.
For the Fund to uphold that crucial element of the treaty obligations
contained in the WTO Agreement, its factual review must reflect that
nuance-that is, the nuance of the special and differential treatment of
developing countries underpinning Article XVIII GATT 1994 provisions.
In that regard, it is a cardinal obligation of the dispute settlements panels
of the WTO to ensure that those special and differential provisions are
not nullified in the course of the Fund's factual review. This is so, because the WTO Agreement requires panels to:
[PIreservethe rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those
agreements in accordance with customary and rules of interpretation of public international law. Recommendations and rulings
of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations
provided in the covered agreements.93
The dispute settlement panel of the WTO is thus a critical element in
ensuring that the negotiated position of Members as articulated in the
WTO treaty obligations are not undermined.94 The point here thus further
underscores the need to ensure that the dispute settlement panel retains
the final word on the evidence submitted to it by the Fund. It is difficult
to see how the panel can perform those functions of preserving Members
93.
DSU, supra note 65, at art. 3.2 (emphasis added).
94.
This requirement bears close resemblance to another prescription that the Fund
should be mindful of the social context of its determinations. Rather than unduly focusing on
the developing country Member "liberalizing" its domestic markets, a more enlightened view

would be for the Fund to focus on persuading Members enjoying a surplus to import more and
generating market access for those in deficit.
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rights were it to accept, willy nilly, the determinations and findings of
the Fund. Such a configuration will most likely result in a situation that
will diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements. For the dispute settlement panel to be perceived as fair and
impartial arbiters of Member's rights and obligations, it is imperative
that its power to pronounce on the consistency of a Member's measures
be not impeded.
3. The Need for Harmonizing Jurisdiction over
Balance-of-Payment95
The impetus for harmonization stems primarily from the interrelatedness of trade and exchange issues arising in the context of a balanceof-payment difficulty already alluded to. At a broader level, Clair WilM that an unregulated restriction on imports might
cox's observation"
circumvent the gains made regulating exchanging restrictions represents
another linkage point for some coordination. On the strength of those
two points, a case could be made out for collaboration between the Fund
and the WTO on balance-of-payment questions.' Quantitative restrictions for balance-of-payment purposes resonate in the Member's
exchange condition and vice-versa. Added to that is the limited competence of the WTO in connection with balance-of-payment.
As figure 3:1 demonstrates, however, the contrasting institutional
dimensions between those two organizations are significant. Collaboration, it must therefore be pointed out, should not be synonymous to a
wholesale delegation of juridical competence by the WTO to the Fund in
the area of balance-of-payment as seems to be the dominant orientation
of the WTO. The Fund's input is admittedly important, but no less so are
the WTO Agreement provisions.
Three approaches are advanced here that might foster confidence:
First, the consultations on balance-of-payment proceedings might be an
opportunity to reiterate the relevant WTO Agreement provisions. For
example, the Committee could direct the Fund in those consultations to
ensure that treaty provisions of the WTO-particularly those concerning
special and differential treatment of developing countries-are reflected
See also Declaration on the Relationship of the World Trade Organization with the
95.
International Monetary Fund, supra note 39. See generally, on the question of subject-matter
linkages, Jose Alvarez, ed., Symposium: The Boundaries of the WTO, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 1
(2002).
See WILcox, supra note 26.
96.
Frederick M. Abbot, drawing on the WTO/WIPO relationship, sees that as an evolv97.
ing model for global economic governance. See Frederick M. Abbott, Distributed Governance
at the WTO-WIPO: An Evolving Modelfor Open ArchitectureIntegrated Governance, in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN H. JACKSON
15, 16 (Marco Bronckers & Reinhard Quick eds., 2000).
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in its findings and determinations. Second, given the current structure of
the Fund, the WTO should perhaps explore the possibility of receiving
balance-of-payment statistics from other organizations for the sake of
transparency. "The determination of balance of payments surplus or
deficit," Poul Host-Madsen reminds us, "is far from a fully objective exercise. ,,98 Tedf
The difficulty, of course, with this suggestion is the
acknowledged competence of the Fund in balance-of-payment questions
and the organization that might serve this objective. Nevertheless, the
transparency of the WTO's assessment of a Member's balance-ofpayment situation, as distinct from that conducted by the Fund, is crucial
to fostering confidence in the international system of trade. One significant consequence of failing to explore alternative sources of balance-ofpayment information that cannot be lost sight of is that the WTO merely
becomes a convenient proxy for enforcing the Fund's de facto juridical
competence over that subject matter. The institutional detachment of the
WTO, especially in situations where it exercises adjudicative powers, is
particularly critical if it is to convey that important message of impartiality to all Members.
Finally, the WTO arguably retains superior competence over the
Fund in matters concerning trade. Given the obvious trade repercussions
of balance-of-payment problems, the discretion of the WTO in examining the overall trade ramifications of Members in redressing it should not
be impaired. This, after all, will also be in line with the Fund's cartographic exercise of 1959.99 An import restriction is clearly an example of
a measure that going by the direct test implicit in that technique method,
is beyond the juridical competence of the Fund notwithstanding its attendant payment repercussions.
4. The Legalization of the International Trade Regime
Another inference apparent from Table 3:1 is the fact that the current
trade system is one arbitrated by legal means as opposed to one shaped
by economic influence and raw economic power-a situation often referred to as the legalization of the international trade sphere.'0° Implicit in
that proposition, is the rather seductive notion that the law is an impartial
98.
See HOST-MADSEN, supra note 2, at 16.
99.
See supra text at note 35.
100.
This thesis has spawned a rich literature. This is especially so given that the period
preceding the creation of the dispute settlement system was said to be characterized by the
exercise of power. See generally, ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT: INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (1997); Emst-Ulich Petersmann, How to Promote the International Rule of Law:

Contributionsby the WTO Appellate Review System, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE ATO 75
(James Cameron & Karen Campbell eds., 1998). See also, Meinhard Hilf, Power,Rules and
Principles-WhichOrientationfor WTO/GATTLaw, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 111 (2001).
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tool that limits the exercise of power. The dispute settlement process of
the WTO is seen as heralding this process of legalization. It envisages a
system where all Members-developing and developed-can invoke the
dispute settlement process and be entitled to fair and dispassionate consideration of their claims.'"'
A range of post-modem theoretical resources clearly demonstrate,
however, that although the law might curtail the exercise of power, it is
often the case that it is complicit with power in maintaining privileged
positions.' 2 Thus, the law could be Janus-faced in that whilst it expands
rights and privileges, it also serves as a complicit tool in denying those
rights. As a hand-maiden to the powerful, this simultaneity of the law
masks the expression of that latter quality. And it is in that context that it
is very important for the dispute settlement process to be perceived as
neutral and transparently fair to all Members. The propositions advanced
in the course of this note in that regard cannot thus be overlooked: its
independence in reaching conclusions on the evidence furnished it by the
Fund and the requirement that the dispute settlement process remains
vigilant in ensuring that treaty provisions are not obscured but protected.
Absent that configuration, the dispute settlement process will degenerate
to a situation where it secures legitimacy to the exercise of power.' 3 This
will, however, over time, sap the confidence instrumental to its legitimacy and existence.
CONCLUSION

The Bretton woods system appears to have come full circle going by
the way jurisdiction is exercised over this subject-matter by the Fund and
the WTO. The review of the materials in the note indicates that although
the WTO retains a notional jurisdiction over trade measures invoked by a
Member for redressing its balance-of-payment problems, it is the Fund,
however, that retains de facto jurisdiction. What seems to have evolved,
in the absence of some coherent position in the WTO regarding the
scope of its juridical competence over balance-of-payment, is that the
principles developed in the Fund have been assimilated in the WTO.
Consequently, unless the arguments advanced in the course of this note
are read into the balance-of-payment provisions in the WTO Agreement,
it can be safely said that what the WTO exercises over that subject
See DSU, supra note 65, at art. 1.1 and 23.
See James F. Faubion, Michel Foucault: Power, in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF FouCAULT, 1954-1984, Vol. 3, XI(James D. Faubion ed., 2000).
Cf. MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER
103.
WRITINGS 1972-1977 79 (Colin Gordon, ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980).
101.
102.
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matter is a mere jurisdictional mirage-a jurisdiction in form but
certainly not in substance. Given the noted contrasting institutional
differences between the Fund and the WTO, the merger bodes ill
especially for developing countries. As argued in the note, collaboration
is important but so long as it is done to reflect sensitivity towards the
peculiar requirements contained in the WTO Agreement. This should be
the desired model especially to ensure that the interests of developing
country Members are not compromised in that process.

